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Abstract:  Usually, the security requirements are addressed by abstracting the security problems arising in a specific 
context and providing a well proven solution to them. Security patterns incorporating proven security expertise solution to the 
recurring security problems have been widely accepted by the community of security engineering. The fundamental 
challenge for using security patterns to satisfy security requirements is the lack of defined syntax, which makes it impossible 
to ask meaningful questions and get semantically meaningful answers. Therefore, this paper presents an ontological approach 
to facilitating security knowledge mapping from security requirements to their corresponding solutions - security patterns. 
Ontologies have been developed using OWL and then incorporated into a security pattern search engine which enables 
sophisticated search and retrieval of security patterns using the proposed algorithm. Applying the introduced approach allows 
security novices to reuse security expertise to develop security software system.  
 
Keywords:  Security pattern, ontology, security requirement, risk analysis, security engineering.
1 Introduction 
Experience shows that it is difficult to design a system 
that can fulfill the specific security requirements by simply 
integrating security mechanism and be error free at the 
same time, even for a small system. Security expertise 
tends to be valuable in such circumstances. However, such 
security expert knowledge is not always available for 
ordinary software developers. What’s more, with software 
systems getting larger and more complicated, the situation 
of software security is getting even worse. 
Inspired by design patterns, security patterns incorporate 
the security expertise to solve the recurring security 
problems in the specific contexts. For security novices, 
security patterns represent security best practices which are 
a convenient way to design secure and reusable software 
systems [1].They document basic mechanisms, processes or 
approaches which provide ways to safeguard CIA features 
of data [2]. 
In this paper, the security problems arising in legacy 
systems are addressed through using security patterns. 
Patterns are well-known solutions to recurring problems 
that arise in specific contexts and specify generic schemes 
with well-defined properties. Pattern writers have 
introduced many collections of security patterns recently. 
In [3], 415 published security patterns have been surveyed, 
of course, the number of existing security patterns is not 
limited to this. However, there are some features missing so 
as to impede the benefit of taking advantage of security 
patterns. One of the most fundamental features is how to 
find the “right” from the existing security patterns to solve 
the given specific security problem. 
It is not possible to get right and meaningful answers 
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automatically because of no syntax defined in security 
patterns [1]. Therefore, a framework for semantic 
description and management of security patterns via 
defining proper security ontology is developed in this paper. 
The fundamental idea is to ease the searching of “right” 
security patterns with the help of ontology technique. 
Security patterns can be described based on the proposed 
security core ontology which describes security patterns 
semantically and precisely. Therefore, sophisticated 
retrieval and search of security patterns are enabled. 
2 Related work 
The increasing importance of security in organizations 
leads to much research focusing on the inclusion of security 
concerns in the software development lifecycle. In this 
section, a review of recent studies on the security pattern 
selection is presented firstly with special regard to security 
pattern organisation and classification. Then, a brief review 
of existing ontologies in the information security domain is 
given. 
2.1 Review of security pattern selection 
The increasing number of patterns and similar security 
patterns appearing in the literature with different names 
makes it necessary to develop classifications of security 
patterns. A classification organises patterns into groups of 
patterns that share one or many properties such as the 
application domain or a particular purpose. Various 
security pattern classification approaches have been 
proposed since Gamma et al. introduced the first 
classification of security patterns (GoF patterns) [4].  
 Heyman et al. [5] classified 220 security patterns into 
three categories: guidelines, process and core patterns. 
Design guidelines described by Viega and McGraw in [6] 
were used to compare 8 security patterns by Cheng et al. in 
[7]. They extended their classification based on access types 
of security patterns and thereby classified patterns in terms 
of application levels: network-level, host-level and 
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 application-level. Kienzle et al. [8, 9] classified security 
patterns into two broad categories, i.e., structural and 
procedural. Another broad classification of security 
patterns was made by Blakley et al. [10]，in which two broad 
categories of security patterns were made: available 
patterns and protected patterns. Halkidis et al. [11] examined 
the evolution feature of security patterns by comparing the 
patterns derived from [10].  Laverdiere et al. [12] proposed 
a six sigma method to classify the 12 common security 
patterns from [7] and [11]. Hafiz et al [13, 14] proposed a 
multi-dimension classification scheme taking consideration 
of security CIA features, application context, security 
wheel, McCumber cube, STRIDE threat modelling, and 
hierarchical classification. The relationships used in their 
work are similar to the dependencies among security 
problem patterns suggested by Hatebur et al. [15]. 
In [16], an ontological interface for software developers 
to select security patterns was proposed. The proposed 
interface contains a mapping between security requirements 
on the one side and threat models, security bugs, security 
errors on the other side taking into consideration their 
contexts of applicability. However, they did not give the 
design and implementation of their ontology. 
Montero et al. [17] proposed a semantic representation 
for domain specific patterns based on domain knowledge. 
The representation was used as an underlying basis for 
complementing the textual description of pattern using 
semantic annotations. However, their approach did not 
fulfill its objective in selecting the appropriate set of 
security patterns.  
It will benefit software developers by providing a 
means to request security patterns through unnecessary 
classified security terms. It is meaningful if the 
classification approaches for security pattern are 
transparent to software developers, especially those 
security novices. From this point of view, the approaches 
mentioned above cannot satisfy such kind of need. 
2.2 Review of security ontology 
Understanding user’s security concerns plays an 
important role in software development since security as 
one of the NFRs becomes more and more important in the 
success of modern software. Ontology can facilitate the 
process as it is regarded as a good approach to 
systematically classifying and categorising various security 
concerns as well as related security countermeasures. 
Therefore, security ontology is considered as an important 
research area within the security engineering by more and 
more researchers.  
Some security ontologies have been proposed for 
general concepts in information security domain. Herzog et 
al. [18] proposed an OWL-based ontology of information 
security on the basis of a book named Principle of 
Information Security [19]. They endeavoured to design an 
extensible ontology for the information security domain 
that covers the whole general concepts. For a similar goal, 
Fenz et al. [20] proposed an security ontology that covers a 
more broader spectrum with 500 concepts. Their ontology 
is then applied to quantified risk assessment by integrating 
ISO/IEC 27001 standard ontology.  
Compared with the above ontologies, the followings 
describe specified aspects of security. Velasco et al.[21] 
proposed an ontology framework for representing and 
reusing security requirements based on risk analysis. 
Security risk ontology and security requirements ontology 
were developed based on the requirement engineering 
standards and implemented using OWL. Tsoumas et al. [22] 
defined a security ontology of risk analysis based on the 
standards to provide security acquisition and knowledge 
management. The security ontology acts as a container for 
the security requirements. 
Schumacher et al. [1] proposed a security ontology to 
maintain the security pattern repository with a theoretical 
security pattern search engine. However, only top level 
concepts were introduced in their ontology, which is too 
abstract to be applied to the specific context.  
Dobson et al. [23] proposed an ontology in dependability 
domain. Denker et al. [24] developed several ontologies for 
security annotations of agents and web services. Karyda et 
al. [25] proposed a security ontology using OWL with which 
to develop secure e-applications. Security patterns were 
defined to capture security expertise to support secure 
application development. 
Although several ontologies in information security 
domain exist, none of them has been proposed to map the 
security knowledge from security requirements to their 
corresponding solutions - security patterns. This paper uses 
ontology as a vehicle for managing different security 
requirements, security patterns and their mapping 
relationships. 
3 Framework of the approach 
An overview of the proposed security enhancement 
framework is shown in Fig. 1.  
The main emphasis will be given to security pattern to 
guide software developers in their effort to fulfil security 
requirements through the design and implementation of 
security solutions so as to provide reliable security services. 
In the proposed approach, security requirements are 
elicited by risk analysis approach derived from our 
previous work [26]and formalised as a list in which elements 
related to security requirement (SR) are represented as 
columns containing asset (A), threat (T), security feature 
(SF) and priority (P). The meaning of these elements in the 
same row is, for a given asset A, one or more threats Ts 
may threaten A by violating one or more security feature 
SFs. P is quantified by using the security vector approach 
derived from our previous work [27]. Therefore, each 
software requirement can be fulfilled in a sequence 
according to the value of P during software development.  
Based on the security requirements specification, a 
pattern searching method is designed for automatic 
identification and retrieval of the most suitable security 
patterns that fulfil the given security requirement with the 
aid of the proposed security ontology inference. In order to 
achieve this goal, both security requirements and security 
patterns are semantically described and stored. 
Security requirements are represented semantically with 
OWL to enable automatic mapping to their solution. Each 
element that makes up the security requirement is 
semantically described, categorised and organised into 
different abstraction levels. Take the element “threat”, for 
instance. It will be classified into Application-level, 
   
Host-level and Network-level.  Each category will be 
further organised into sub-categories.   
Security patterns are semantically described with 
specific profiles and solutions for various contexts. The 
descriptions of security pattern include abstraction level, 
type of solution, applicability, context conditions and 
security properties provided by the pattern. A series 
semantic properties is defined to each pattern, such as 
“security attribute: Confidentiality”, “Deployed in design 
phase” …and so on. The incorporation of precise and rich 
semantic descriptions of the security patterns enables the 
use of automated reasoning mechanisms capable of 
searching proper patterns to fulfil the given security 
requirement.  
Security patterns are formatted and stored in a 
repository to support the following security pattern 
integration. While the appropriate security pattern is found 
via the pattern search engine, corresponding security 
pattern document can be selected from the pattern 
repository and thereby be integrated into the system model.  
  Besides the semantic description of security 
requirements and security patterns, mapping algorithms and 
inference rules as parts of security ontology are developed 
and stored to form a security knowledge base together with 
the security pattern repository.  
Fig. 2 shows the structure of the proposed security 
knowledge base. Basically, the structure of the security 
knowledge base is similar to a tree structure for storing 
security related information that helps to reveal and 
organise the security relevant features, and for relating 
these properties to fundamental security requirements. It 
consists of two sub repositories, security ontology base and 
security pattern base. Security ontology base is used to 
store the established ontology including concepts and 
relationships while security pattern base is the repository to 
store and organise the common security patterns for further 
processing. Considering the reusability of the stored 
security relevant information, the information is expressed 
in a generalised way and focuses on the abstract level. 
Finally, selected security patterns will be adapted, 
instantiated and integrated in the system design model to be 
implemented by software developers. Therefore, security 
features can be incorporated to protect the system against 
security attacks. 
4 Security requirement elicitation 
Security requirements represent the types and levels 
when attempts to protect the assets to meet security policy 
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Fig.2  Class diagram for the meta-model of security knowledge base 
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 [28]. A complete and consistent group of security 
requirements can be produced by using an elicitation 
method. Specially, security requirements are identified by 
risk analysis—“the systematic use of information to 
identify sources and to estimate the risk” [29]. 
Usually, most functional requirements are specified as 
what must happen, while security requirements are stated in 
terms of what must not be allowed to happen. After the risk 
analysis, assets can be enumerated with criticality level, 
threats threatening the assets can be elicited with severity 
risk level, security features that would be violated by 
potential threats on assets can be analysed, and priority 
level representing the developing order of the security 
requirements can be computed. 
It is impossible to develop a completely secure system 
because of the budget, deadline, and resources needed for 
the development and the emerging new kinds of attacks, 
even if it could be done, the usability and efficiency of the 
developed system may be decreased. Thus, developing 
secure systems is about trade-offs and it is quite a challenge 
to find a balance point. Prioritising of each elicited security 
requirement and incorporating user’s security objectives 
play a key role when facing such a dilemma. 
The criticality of each asset has to be evaluated, which 
implies a criterion for the security threshold of an asset is 
decided according to not only the impact value but also the 
risk for the asset, including likelihood and impact. 
Therefore, analysing the threat and vulnerability of a 
system in order to evaluate the risk is required. Specially, 
analysis of the threats threatening to the system is used as s 
a means of identifying why the assets need protection. In 
addition, the vulnerability of the system is detected and 
analysed in order to understand what weakness exists in the 
system that can be exploited by the threats. This is the 
process of security requirement elicitation. The outcome of 
this process will be a list of security requirements with 
priorities representing their criticalities to the system. Table 
1 shows an example output of security requirement 
elicitation.  
The security level of a software system can be 
illustrated in Fig. 3 and be quantified by using the security 
vector approach SV <A, T, V> in (1) proposed in the 
previous work [27]. It can be used as the priority order of 
security requirements when system designers develop 
security aspects or countermeasures to fulfil them. Table 1 
shows an example of security requirement format in this 
paper. 
v
2
t
2
a
2SV WVWTWA      ⑴ 
where Wa is the weight of asset A, Wt is the weight of 
threat T, and Wv the weight of vulnerability V. Security 
factors including asset, threat and vulnerability are 
quantified and treated as the elements of the security 
vectors SV.  
5 Security pattern 
Security patterns incorporate proven security expertise 
solutions to the recurring security problems. Usually, the 
security requirements are addressed by abstracting the 
security problems arising in a specific context and 
providing a well proven solution to them [30]. The ability of 
security patterns to mitigate and stop security threats can be 
found in [11, 31] where security patterns incorporated into 
the system could contribute to the improvement of system’s 
security level [32].  
It should be noted that security patterns can be designed 
and developed by security experts for different kinds of 
problem solving and be applied to different contexts. For 
example, they can be abstract higher level architectural 
patterns that specify how to resolve a security problem 
architecturally, or they can be even more abstract patterns 
that depict the process to secure software development, or 
they can be defensive design level patterns describing how 
the detailed security artefacts can be created [30]. 
5.1  Security pattern format 
The documentation of security patterns were originally 
built by Yoder et al. [33] in 1997.  Seven architectural 
security patterns are presented and structured using the 
formats in POSA [34] or GoF [4] which are generic schemes 
for describing design patterns in the architecture level. 
The format is composed of several elements shown as 
follows [7]: 
• Intent: description of goal and issues the pattern 
addresses; 
• Context: description of situations or environment in 
which the pattern is used; 
• Problem: description of the problem that this pattern 
solves;  
• Description: description of the scenarios that illustrate 
the design problem;  
• Solution: description of the solution to the problem; 
• Consequences: description of the trade-offs and 
results when this pattern is used; 
• Forces: description of constraints that should be 
considered when the pattern is applied. 
• Known uses: description of the patterns use found in 
real systems;  
• Related patterns: description of the related patterns 
that use this pattern as a reference.  
In the view of pattern format, pattern authors can 
describe all sections which they consider of importance. 
Therefore, for all the elements in a security pattern, just 
Problem and Context elements are useful while searching 
 
Fig. 3  Security vectors[27] 
   
proper security patterns from a security point of view. 
The structure of security patterns adopted in this paper 
is based on the traditional design patterns. They have an 
expressive name, an application context, problem to be 
solved and a solution to that problem.  
Therefore, security pattern is represented as a 3-tuple 
<Context, Problem, Solution> where: 
• Context defines the conditions and situation in which 
the pattern is applicable 
Time and location are usually regarded as important 
characteristics of context in the security domain. Time 
relates to when a security problem occurs and the location 
specifies at which level of the system infrastructure a 
security problem occurs. In terms of software domain, 
typical example of the time within a context is software life 
cycle phases which are analysis, design, implementation, 
integration, and location where the operation occurs usually 
expressed as application, host and network [1].     
• Problem defines the vulnerable aspect of an asset  
The problem field of a security pattern is important for 
software developers to determine whether a security pattern 
is appropriate for their situation. This field defines the 
security problems that occur in the specific contexts and 
can be solved by the security pattern. A security problem 
occurs whenever a system is unprotected or is protected 
insufficiently against abuse or misuse. Generally speaking, 
the security problem can be some kinds of threats which 
cause possible danger or damage when someone or 
something violates security policies. 
• Solution defines the scheme that solves the security 
problem which occurs in the security context 
Security solution is a group of countermeasures to be 
applied in the system in order to mitigate the security risk. 
It is meaningful that at least one security countermeasure is 
implemented to keep the system invulnerable for each 
threat. 
5.2 Security pattern organisation 
A significant number of security patterns have been 
proposed since the first effort in 1977 by Yoder et al. [33]. A 
security pattern may address more than one security feature, 
for example, Authentication pattern can protect both 
confidentiality and integrity security features. At the same 
time, for a specific security property, there may be more 
than one security pattern to address it. It is a many-to-many 
situation. Additionally, security patterns may be organised 
by different parameters from abstract to more specific. 
Hence, it is difficult to find the “right” security patterns for 
solving a particular security problem without a proper 
classification scheme of security patterns [14]. A suitable 
classification scheme not only contributes to efficient 
information storage and retrieval, but also benefits both 
pattern navigators and pattern miners.  
In this section, on the basis of several existing 
classification frameworks, an efficient classification 
framework for security patterns has been described to 
facilitate finding the proper security patterns according to 
the elicited security requirements. As the security 
requirement is based on threat modelling and asset analysis, 
the properties of threat and asset will be considered as the 
factors for selecting security patterns. The proposed 
classification scheme is based on multiple aspects of the 
relevant information. 
 Lifecycle Stage. 
While most of the security patterns take the form derived 
from design patterns, not all security patterns are dedicated 
to design phase. Therefore, classification on the lifecycle 
stages is meaningful for organising security patterns 
ordered on the dichotomy of beginning and end, which are: 
Analysis, Architecture, Design, Implementation, and 
Deployment. 
 Architectural Layer. 
Layer provides another useful dimension, since problems 
and their solutions in different layers of the architecture 
differ, yet all are important. Roughly, the architecture has 
been divided with an ordering from low to high level of 
abstraction. The following distinctions are used as the 
architecture layers, which are: Data, Application, System, 
and Network.    
 Application Context.  
The structure of the system is usually taken into 
consideration as another classification factor to partition the 
security patterns according to which part of the system they 
are trying to protect [14]. The security of a system is 
analysed from three levels: core security, perimeter security 
and exterior security. The core security deals with the 
security implementation within the system while the 
perimeter security focuses on security related issues at the 
system entry points, such as authorisation, authentication 
and security. The exterior security considers protecting data 
during transmission and securing communication protocols. 
 Domain Specific 
Application domain can provide an important 
differentiator or a filter to narrow the field of applicable 
knowledge [35]. Some security pattern solutions are specific 
to a particular domain or application type. This dimension 
is an exception in that it does not have a dichotomy or 
ordering—the space is freely defined. Pattern designers can 
create patterns for their own domain as a form of 
knowledge capture. After examining the existing security 
pattern, several example domains are provided in this paper: 
Ubiquitous computing, Distributed computing, Web and 
J2EE, Embedded system, Operating system, Service 
oriented architecture, SCADA (supervisory control and 
data acquisition), and not limited to this coverage. 
 Threat Type.  
The classification scheme based on threat modelling is 
more intuitive because it uses the security problems that the 
patterns solve. Security architects use threat modelling to 
identify and prioritise a system’s security threat which 
makes the prioritisation of the mitigation effort possible. 
STRIDE [36] is one of the widely used models to classify 
threats according to different sources. It is the English 
acronym of the following six threat types [36]: 
o Spoofing is someone or something 
masquerades to be legitimate and valid. 
o Tampering is data interfered or modified 
during network communication. 
 o Repudiation is the situation that user denies 
performing a certain action which could be 
illegal and harmful. 
o Information disclosure is when an unauthorised 
user gets access to confidential information, 
which he or she is not supposed to have access 
to. 
o Denial of service is basically when a service is 
brought down intentionally or unintentionally, 
resulting in the disruption of normal services 
for legitimate users. 
o Elevation of privilege is when an unauthorised 
user gets higher privilege access from the one 
he or she was supposed to have, which might 
result in access to restricted information, or 
might apply dangerous tasks. 
 Security Concerns 
Software patterns are usually chosen by software 
developers with a particular goal in mind. Developers tend 
to view security in terms of software requirements rather 
than taking the perspective of an attack. Therefore, it is 
necessary to apply security goals or concerns to classify the 
security patterns. This metric is more straight and easier 
understood to software designer to select proper security 
patterns in the security design. In this paper, the most 
frequently used security concerns are listed as: Access 
control, Authentication, Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability, Accountability, and Non-repudiation. 
For better visualisation, Table 2 summarises the 
classification scheme for security patterns. 
6 Security ontology  
An ontology, in the field of knowledge representation, is 
most often defined as “a representation of a 
conceptualisation” [37]. A more detailed description of 
ontology is that “it is a formal representation of the entities 
and relationships which exist in some domains, it should 
also represent a shared conceptualisation in order to meet 
any useful purpose” [23]. Ontologies are useful for 
representing and inter-relating many kinds of knowledge. 
In 2003, Marc Donner urged the necessity of having good 
security ontologies. He argued that too much security 
terminology is vaguely defined, thus it becomes difficult to 
communicate between colleagues and, worse, confusing to 
deal with the people we try to serve: “What the field needs 
is an ontology – a set of descriptions of the most important 
concepts and the relationships among them. A great 
ontology will help us report incidents more effectively, 
share data and information across organisations, and 
discuss issues among ourselves” [38].  
The advantages of applying ontology technology into the 
information security domain are specified in [39] from three 
viewpoints: (1) ontologies can eliminate the ambiguity of 
items to a properties list and organise information in a 
systematic way at detailed level; (2) ontological technology 
can induce the modularity which can be used by other 
approaches, for example, to detect some new features by 
establishing relations among different measurements; and 
(3) an ontological approach has the ability to forecast 
security problems by providing inference mechanisms. 
The approach proposed in this paper can be summarised 
by the following points. The security patterns for software 
engineering are created to document the knowledge of the 
experts in security field. These patterns are designed by 
using the ontology techniques that provide reusable and 
structured activities or solve security problems that may 
arise during the development of software systems. 
Moreover, due to the OWL representation, the security 
patterns are available in a machine readable format and it is 
expected to be automatically utilised in the system. 
This section addresses the issue of fulfilling elicited 
security requirements. The approach uses ontologies as a 
tool for managing different security requirements and 
associating them with corresponding security solutions 
provided by security patterns. 
The main goal is to provide a security ontology based 
framework, which unifies the proposed methods in security 
evolution for legacy systems. The ontology “knows” which 
threats threaten which assets, and which security patterns 
could lower the probability of occurrence in which contexts. 
It is meaningful for the software developer to find the 
appropriate security patterns by adopting an ontology based 
approach [16]. 
6.1 Overview of the proposed ontology 
The proposed security ontology is designed to achieve 
the following goals: 
 Describe risk relevant information especially 
security requirement information applicable to web 
application 
 Design security pattern ontology at two abstraction 
levels 
 Facilitate mapping security requirements to security 
patterns 
 Provide the ability to annotate security related 
information to facilitate the security pattern 
selection 
 Create reusable and easy to extend ontologies  
The designed ontologies are supposed to be used by both 
the security pattern providers who design new security 
patterns and edit the corresponding ontology into the 
ontology base to express their security capabilities, and the 
security requirement requestors who have got security 
requirements to be fulfilled by security patterns. From the 
security requestor’s point of view, security requirements 
can be stated in terms of 4-tuple <Asset, Threat, Security 
Attribute, Priority>, which is elicited from the proposed 
risk assessment method in [27]. When it comes to the 
security pattern provider, the security capabilities are 
expressed in terms of security patterns which are organised 
as 3-tuple <Context, Security Problem, Security Solution>. 
The proposed ontology has been developed by using 
OWL, which is a language based on RDF for processing 
web information by the computer rather than being read by 
people.  OWL is the current recommendation of W3C 
(World Wide Web Consortium) for processing the content 
of web information. OWL is a part of semantic web and has 
three sublanguages, OWL Lite, OWL DL (including OWL 
Lite), and OWL Full (including OWL DL). Based on 
Description Logics, OWL-DL has been used to design the 
   
proposed ontology for its expressivity is suitable for the 
requirement and allows for complete reasoning by DL 
reasoner, for example, Racer, FaCT++ or Pellet.  
The tools used for developing and querying the security 
ontologies are Protégé and FaCT++. The Protégé Ontology 
Editor (Protégé) provides the graphical interface for 
ontology designers to build OWL ontologies. However, the 
Protégé itself only provides editing function so that a 
reasoner (FaCT++, in this study) is required to check the 
consistency of the developed ontology. 
6.2 Development of the proposed security 
ontology 
Designing OWL ontology is not only defining a set of 
classes and properties, but also including a collection of 
restrictions and axioms. This ensures that the correct result 
can be inferred from the proposed ontology.  
There are several methods to develop ontology. The 
method used in this paper is based on METHONTOLOGY 
[40]. The development of security ontology is carried out in 
the following phases: 
 Define questions. A collection of questions within 
the domain is defined to indicate what kind of 
answers and information are expected by using the 
ontology. The questions are informal and loosely 
structure as any forms.  Some important concepts 
can be identified during this process, which can be 
termed as the basis when building ontology classes. 
 Build classes. Based on the previous phase, a lot of 
relevant concepts and terms have been identified 
and recorded. They can be classified and selected 
according to their relevancy to the domain to form 
the classes, or properties of the proposed ontology.  
 Build relationships. This process involves 
clarifying the relationships among the classes and 
defining the hierarchy. It is the process of adding 
axioms and restrictions to the ontology. Axiom is a 
set of assertions specifying what is true in the 
domain. It is used to connect classes and properties 
with some logical information about them. 
Restriction is a special kind of class description 
with which all individuals in that class will satisfy 
the restriction.  
 Build ontology instance. This is the procedure to 
create instances of the classes, which refers to 
inserting the individual information or providing 
examples of each of the classes. 
 Validate ontology. The competence questions built 
in the first phase can be used to validate the 
correctness of the proposed ontology. 
The aforementioned phases have been repeated several 
times until the provided answers from the proposed 
ontology satisfy the competency questions. 
To accomplish the automatic mapping between security 
requirements and security patterns, a security ontology is 
developed based on [20] and its top-level concepts and 
relations are shown in Fig. 4. It is composed of two 
subontologies: security requirement subontology (sr) and 
security pattern subontology (sp). The security requirement 
subontology consists of the core concepts: Asset (sr:asset), 
Threat (sr:threat), Vulnerability (sr:vulnerability), Attribute 
(sr:attribute), Priority (sr:priority). The security pattern 
subontology is composed of the core concepts: Security 
Context (sp:context), Security Problem (sp:problem), 
Security Solution (sp:solution). The concepts of sr:asset 
have been derived from [41], sr:vulnerability and sr:threat 
from [42], while security pattern subontology concepts are 
derived from [1]. 
6.3 Security requirements subontology 
In our previous work [26, 27], the security requirement is 
identified by risk analysis, which is one of the sources to 
elicit security requirement. Consequently, the requirement 
ontology (Fig. 5) is developed with the concepts derived 
from the risk analysis using Protégé Editor. The 
meta-information associated with risk analysis (such as 
asset and threat) can be used to define axioms, constraints 
and rules that help to maintain the consistency of the 
proposed security requirement ontology. 
Every security requirement is a description of which 
asset is threatened by which kind of threat by violating 
which security objective and to which severity extent. The 
properties defined in security requirement ontology are 
described below: 
 Each requirement is characterised by a unique 
identifier and has been defined as Datatype 
property in OWL. 
 
 
Fig. 4  Proposed security ontology top level concepts and relations 
Vulnerability Threat
Asset
Security 
Requirement
Priority
Security 
Attribute
Security 
Context
Security 
Problem
Security Pattern
Security 
Solution
Solution Type
is kind of
implemented by
is part ofis part 
of
is part 
of
v
u
ln
er
ab
il
it
y
 o
n
exploited by
threatens
is part of
is part of
is part of
is part 
of
has solution 
type
is solved 
by
Stakeholder
requires level
Severity 
Scale
has severity
ow
ned by
Threat Type
Domain
Security 
Concerns
Severity 
Scale
has severity
is kind of
ha
s 
do
m
ai
n
has 
security 
concerns
has threat type
  hasAsset: it represents the asset related to this 
requirement. It is defined as an object property with 
domain defined as class 
SecurityRequirementElement and range as class 
asset. 
 isThreatenedBy: it represents possible threats that 
endanger the asset and then make the requirement 
unfulfilled. This property is represented by an 
object property and its range is the class Threat (Fig. 
6) defined in this ontology. According to the risk 
analysis in [27], there are constraints of which threat 
can occur to which asset. Fig. 7 shows partial of the 
security ontology defined in OWL. 
 hasSecurityAttribute: the features that make an 
asset valuable. There exist four types of security 
properties using an object property: 
“Confidentiality”, “Integrity”, “Availability” and 
“Accountability”. 
 hasPriority: the value can be computed by using (1) 
taking asset criticality, threat severity and 
vulnerability severity scale into account and shows 
the order of development. Datatype property 
{“high”, “Medium”, “Low”}. 
 
6.4 Security pattern subontology 
As described in Section 4.1, the structure of the security 
pattern is a 3-tuple <Context, Problem, Solution> from the 
security point of view. Moreover, there are relationships 
among security patterns.  
Fig. 8 illustrates of security pattern subonotolgy which 
is based on [1]. The main properties of the pattern 
subontology are shown below: 
 Security patterns are characterised by a unique 
identifier and a text description. Both have been 
defined in OWL as Datatype properties. 
 hasContext: it represents the situation in which the 
security problem occurs and is defined as object 
property. The range of it is subclass 
SecurityContext. Two subproperties are hasLayer 
 
Fig. 5  Top level of security requirement ontology 
 
Fig. 6  Top level of threat ontology 
<owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;Asset"> 
       <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
</owl:Class> 
< owl:Class rdf:about="&Security;Threat"> 
    <rdfs:subClassOf 
rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityRequirementElement"/> 
</ owl:Class> 
… 
<owl:ObjectProperty rdf:about="&Security;isThreatenedBy"> 
   <rdfs:domain rdf:resource="&Security;Asset"/> 
   <rdfs:range rdf:resource="&Security;SecurityProblem"/> 
   <inverseOf rdf:resource="&Security;hasAsset"/> 
</owl:ObjectProperty> 
… 
<NamedIndividual rdf:about="&Security;DataTampering"> 
   <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Authorization"/> 
   <rdf:type rdf:resource="&Security;Sensitive_Data"/> 
   <Security:residesOn   
rdf:resource="&Security;Application"/> 
</NamedIndividual> 
Fig. 7 Partial ontology definition in OWL 
    
and hasLifeCycle, whose ranges are Layer and 
LifeCycle, respectively. 
 hasProblem: it represents the security problem that 
occurs in such a security context and is defined as 
object property. The range of it is subclass 
SecurityProblem and an axiom is added as 
equivalent as subclass Threat in Security 
Requirement subontology.  
 hasSolution: it represents the security solution to 
the security problem that occurs in the given 
security context. 
 hasThreatType: it represents the problem type 
classified according to threats whose domain is 
SecurityPattern and range is ThreatType. 
 hasSecurityConcerns: it represents the security 
features the security pattern holds. 
 hasDomain: application domain the security pattern 
serves. It is defined as object property whose 
domain is SecurityPattern and range is Domain. 
 requires: it represents the Require relationship 
between security patterns. It is added as object 
property with the range being SecurityPattern. 
 isSpecialisedBy: it represents the Specialise 
relationship between security patterns. It is added 
as object property with the range being 
SecurityPattern.  
7 Security pattern search engine  
Since this study aims to support the security pattern 
selection process provided that the security requirements 
have been elicited, a security pattern search engine (Fig. 9) 
is designed to facilitate the process and therefore to validate 
the proposed security ontology. 
In this case, 32 security patterns are selected from the 
published literatures and form the pattern repository which 
can be extended as needed. An example of the proposed 
security pattern repository is partially shown in Table 3. 
Patterns in the repository are organised and labeled using 
the proposed classification scheme. 
The pattern search engine is composed of four 
functions and can be implemented by incorporating OWL 
API: 
 Input function. An input function receives the 
user’s required security requirement or takes the 
set of security requirements as input. 
 Infer function. An infer function infers the 
developed security ontology to find the security 
patterns according to the user input by using OWL 
API. The core of infer function is the algorithms 
realising the mapping.  
 Search function. A search function will search the 
security pattern repository according to the 
mapping result of infer function and returns the 
development specification of the selected patterns 
which can be used by developer. 
 Output function. An output function returns the 
mapping index between security requirement and 
mitigation security patterns.  
 
Fig. 9  Pattern selection process 
The key part of the pattern search engine is some 
algorithms that match the security patterns with required 
security requirements until either there are no more security 
requirements existing, or there are no more security 
patterns which can be matched with them.  
7.1 Algorithm 
In order to extract the corresponding results from the 
proposed security ontology, the Protégé OWL API can be 
used to encode the competency questions in the algorithm 
structure. The OWL API is a Java application interface and 
reference implementation for creating, manipulating and 
serialising OWL ontologies. In the following, a 
representative algorithm is given in a pseudo code format 
to show how the search engine performs the infer function. 
 
Fig. 8  Top level of security pattern ontology  
 By incorporating OWL API, Algorithm 1 is used to 
search the security patterns which can mitigate the threats 
threatening the given asset by violating the given security 
attributes in a given domain. In the GetRelated(x, y) 
function, x is a given concept, while y is a relation (also 
called object property in Protégé OWL). The GetRelated(x, 
y) function returns a collection of concepts which are 
related with x via y. The GetInstances(x) function returns a 
collection of instances (also called individuals in Protégé 
OWL) belonging to concept x. 
7.2 Evaluation 
The security pattern search engine aims to provide the 
inferring and searching capability with an interactive 
interface. The kernel of engine is the proper ontology 
definition and matching algorithm.    
Result of the pattern searching process is a data set 
comprising the selected security patterns, which is then 
evaluated by security expert.  Evaluation of the result is 
the process of evaluating the efficiency of the proposed 
security ontology.  
Usually, the system developers come up with 
competency questions to validate the ontology. The 
questions are designed as indicative of what the ontology 
can handle and reason about rather than as exhaustive as 
possible. In this paper, each of the questions is firstly 
expressed formally as a DL-query, which is a query 
language that can be used to query RDF and OWL-DL 
ontologies, and then the query results are presented with 
comments in appropriated place. One of the examples is 
illustrated in Fig. 10 showing the evaluation result while 
using the proposed ontology to process the security pattern 
searching.  
 Q1: Which threats threaten the integrity attribute of 
internal data assets in the network layer? 
DL Query: Threat and (threaten some (Asset and (Asset 
value InternalData) and (SecurityAttribute value 
Integrity)) and (resideOn value Network)) 
DL Result: Spoofing 
       Session Hijacking 
 Q2: Which security patterns protect the sensitive data 
against the threat of network eavesdropping?  
 DL Query: SecurityPattern and (hasProblem some 
(Threat and (Threat value NetworkEavesdropping) and 
(threaten value SensitiveData))) 
DL Result: Secure Pipe 
        Secure Communication 
        Secure Association 
   Q3: Which security patterns can be used in Web and 
J2EE domain to address the SQL injection threat? 
   DL Query: SecurityPattern and (hasDomain value 
WebAndJ2EE) and (hasProblem and (Threat value 
SQLInjection)) 
DL Result: Input validator 
Due to the high degree of complexity, it is inefficient to 
answer all of the competency questions using simple 
ontology queries. However, it illustrates the ability of 
ontology to answer such complex questions.   
8 Conclusions 
Based on our previous work of security requirement 
elicitation, this paper promotes the application of security 
pattern to the secure software development. Security 
patterns make it possible for security novices to integrate 
security expertise into their development. However, the 
number of security patterns and their different 
representation forms make it difficult to select the “right” 
patterns for fulfilling a given security requirement.  
   In this paper, an ontological approach is proposed to 
manage security requirements, security patterns and the 
mapping relationships among them. The ontology has been 
developed using formal method and implemented in OWL. 
The ontology facilitates security knowledge mapping from 
security requirements to security patterns. The definition of 
proposed ontology is based on security requirement derived 
from the previous work [27] and knowledge of security 
pattern from [2, 4, 30]. Moreover, a prototype capable of 
searching security patterns is designed by processing the 
knowledge contained in the proposed ontology.  
The proposed approach is novel and unique. It smooths 
the transferring from security requirements to secure 
architecture by using security patterns. It combines security 
requirements, the pattern approach and ontology paradigm 
in order to improve the application of security patterns to 
security engineering domain.  
Future directions for this approach will focus on two 
main areas. One is the extension of the requirement 
Fig. 10  Example of query result in Protégé editor  
    
ontology using widely accepted standards, such as 
OCTAVE or ISO/IEC 27001. The other area is the 
implementation of the prototype system, in which the 
expert systems might be used to improve the selection of 
security patterns.    
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 Table 1   Example of security requirements 
SR No. Asset Threat CIAA Priority 
SR1 User bank account Sniffing Confidential High 
SR2 User account Cross-site Scripting Confidential, Integrity High 
SR3 Place order User Denies Performing an Operation Accountability Low 
SR4 Display product Denial of Service Availability Medium 
SR5 Product Catalogue Data tampering  Integrity Medium 
 
 
Table 2   Summary of the proposed multiple aspects classification scheme 
Criteria Classification 
Application 
Context 
Core Perimeter Exterior     
Architectural 
Layer 
Data Application System Network    
Lifecycle Stage Analysis Architecture Design Implementation Deployment   
Domain Specific 
(Not limited) 
Ubiquitous 
computing 
Distributed 
computing 
Web and J2EE Embedded 
system 
Operating 
system 
SOA  
Threat Type 
(STRIDE) 
Spoofing Tampering Repudiation Information 
disclosure 
Denial of 
service 
Elevation 
of privilege 
 
Security 
Concerns 
Access 
control  
Authentication Confidentiality Integrity Availability Accountabi
lity  
Non-repudi
ation 
 
 
 
Table 3  Example of security pattern repository organised by proposed classification scheme 
Pattern Name Application Architectural Lifecycle 
Stage 
Domain 
Specific 
Threat Type Security 
Concerns 
Audit Interceptor [30] Core Application Design Web and J2EE Repudiation Accounting 
Authenticator [1] Perimeter Application Design ALL Spoofing Authentication 
Authorisation [1] Perimeter Application  Architecture ALL Information 
Disclosure 
Access Control 
Checkpointed System [10] Core Application  Architecture ALL Tampering Availability 
Intercepting Validator [30] Core Data Design Web and J2EE Spoofing Integrity 
Secure Logger[30] Exterior Data Design Web and J2EE Tampering Accountability 
Non-repudiation 
Secure Pipe[30] Exterior Network Design Web and J2EE Information 
Disclosure 
Confidentiality 
 
   
 
Algorithm 1 Security patterns searching 
Input A is the given asset 
SA is the given security attribute 
D is the given application domain 
Output SP is the security pattern array 
Initialisation SP=∅ 
procedure getAsset(A, SA, D) return SP 
1. A ← given asset 
2. SA← given security attribute 
3. D← given domain 
4. SP←Null 
5. TL← GetRelated(A, sr:isThreatedBy) 
6. for i←0 to TL.Length do 
7. T← GetInstance(TL[i]) 
8. for j←0 to T.Length do 
9. if T[j].sr:hasSecurityAttribute ==SA then 
10.      P← GetRelated(T[j],sp:isSolvedBy) 
11.      for k← 0 to P.Length do 
12.              PI ← GetInstance(P[k]) 
13.              for m ← 0 to PI.Length do 
14.              if PI[m].sp:hasDomain= = D then  
15.                  if PI[m].sp:hasLayer = = T[j].sr:residesOn then 
16.                       PR← GetRealted(PI[m], sp:requires) 
{*PR is the pattern set in which pattern is required by the exacted pattern  
with “require” relation in security pattern subontology sp*} 
17.                        PS←GetRelated(PI[m], sp:isSpecialisedBy) 
{*PS is the pattern set in which pattern specifies the exacted pattern with 
“isSpecialisedBy” relation in security pattern subontology sp*} 
18.                             if PS.Length !=0 then 
19.                                for l← to PS.Length do 
20.                                   SP.Add(PS[l]) 
21.                                 end for 
22.                              else  
23.                                  SP.Add(P[m]) 
24.                              end if 
25.                              if PR.Length !=0 then 
26.                                for n← to PR.Length do 
27.                                  SP.Add(PR[n]) 
28.                                  Line 16 to Line 27 with PR[n] for PI[m] 
29.                                 end for 
30.                               end if 
31.                         end if 
32.                     end if 
33.                 end for 
34.              end for 
35.          end if 
36.     end for 
37.  end for 
38.  return T    
39.  return SP 
